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The rise of the populist right in the West is emerging as the most discussed manifestation of 
nationalism in the world today. In this paper, I argue that this ‘new nationalism’ is largely 
driven by immigration, which affects ethnic majorities within nation-states. This in turn alters 
the ethnic character of the nation, challenging what I term the ethno-traditions of nationhood. 
Our inherited concepts of ethnic and civic nationalism were developed in an earlier period 
when immigration was limited and territorial revisionism animated nationalist movements. 
Only on the furthest reaches of the extreme right is the worldview one of ethnic nationalism. 
In our demographically churning yet territorially static western world, we need a new term to 
describe the cultural nationalism of the anti-immigration right. I characterise this as ethno-
traditional nationalism, a variety of nationalism which seeks to protect the traditional 
preponderance of ethnic majorities through slower immigration and assimilation, but which 





The rise of the populist right in the West is emerging as the most discussed manifestation of 
nationalism in the world today. In this paper, I argue that this ‘new nationalism’ is largely 
driven by immigration, which affects ethnic majorities within nation-states. This in turn alters 
the ethnic character of the nation, challenging what I term the ethno-traditions of nationhood 
- a change which mobilises resistance among both majority and minority cultural 
conservatives. In other words, the ethnic majority and other established ethnic groups are 
symbols of the nation alongside other reference points such as language or ideology. This 
approach represents an extension of Anthony Smith’s (1998) theory of ethnosymbolism. 
Rather than apply it to the origin of nations, I use it to account for the motivation of leaders 
of, and voters for, populist right political parties. These aim to protect the ethnic majority – a 
symbol of the nation - through immigration restriction and ethnic assimilation.  
Unfortunately, our theories of nationalism were either developed during periods of 
limited immigration or grew from historical analyses of periods in which ethnic change was 
modest. The concept of ethnic nationalism was developed to explain the activities of 
movements during a period of geopolitical uncertainty whose aim was to legitimate territorial 
and political claims to independent statehood. By contrast, the ‘new nationalism’ is unfolding 
in a world of secure nation-states and is generally uninterested in territorial revisionism. 
Ethnic tradition, not political boundaries, is at issue. Undaunted, scholars have stretched 
concepts such as ethnic and civic nationalism to explain the new forms of nationalism; retro-
fitted existing terms such as nation with prefixes such as ‘racial’ or ‘majority’; or sought to 
use hazily-defined political epithets such as nativism, xenophobia and racism to conduct 
scholarly analyses. 
Events on the ground often shape the nature of nationalism studies. Hans Kohn (1944) 
and Alfred Cobban (1945), writing towards the end of World War II, divided the world into 
malign ‘eastern’ and benign ‘western’ nations, corresponding roughly to the Axis and Allied 
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powers. Out of this came the ‘ethnic-civic’ paradigm in nationalism studies. Here the focus 
was partly on how nationalism propelled states into political conflict and partly on cultural 
questions of how minorities were treated. 
The next wave of real-world developments, secession of colonies from saltwater 
empires, concentrated minds on questions of high politics, postcolonial elite mobilisation and 
the formation of new states. Anti-colonial nationalisms began in the 1940s, cresting in the 
1950s and early 1960s. New secessionist movements gained traction in Quebec, Northern 
Ireland and Flanders in the 1960s, and in Catalonia and Scotland in the 1970s. Early theories 
of nationalism appeared from Elie Kedourie (1960) and Ernest Gellner (1964). Classic 
historical-sociological works by Gellner, Smith, Anderson, Hobsbawm and Breuilly followed 
in the early to mid-1980s. When the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism 
(ASEN) was founded in 1990 by Anthony Smith and his graduate students, scholarly work 
focused on post-Soviet secessionist nationalism and related events like the breakup of 
Yugoslavia. The concern with secession, like the earlier ethnic-civic debate, was primarily 
about the problem of power and territory: how states were breaking apart along lines 
demarcating communities of culture, history and/or shared sentiment. Perennialist versus 
constructionist, ethnosymbolist versus modernist, were the main analytical frameworks. 
Immigration and ethnic change didn’t figure prominently in these earlier waves of theory 
development of the 1940s, 1960s or 1980s-90s. This is why the classic works of nationalism 
theory did not develop the nuanced conceptual tools we require at the moment. 
 The same holds for ethnicity theory. The period from the 1960s to the 1980s 
witnessed the Civil Rights movement in the United States, rise of aboriginal activism in 
North America and Australasia and the growth of immigrant communities in Europe. Out of 
this ideological and demographic ferment came new research agendas on multiculturalism, 
diaspora, and, later, whiteness (Kymlicka 1995; Delgado and Stefancic 1997). Yet this work 
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was more normative than was the case for nationalism theory, creating a blind spot which 
neglected the identity movements of dominant/majority ethnic groups, or derided them in 
one-dimensional terms as racist or ethno-nationalist, obfuscating the nuances therein.  
Comparativists and historians of nationalism came closer to diagnosing the concept, 
deploying terms such as titular group or staatsvolk, while Anthony Smith coined the term 
‘dominant ethnie.’ Yet Smith’s consideration of dominant ethnies tended to end with the birth 
of the modern nation-state (Kaufmann and Zimmer 2004). As a student of Smith’s studying 
the response of the WASP American dominant ethnie to immigration, I argued that ethnic 
majorities and dominant minorities remain important actors even after the birth of the modern 
nation (Kaufmann 2004a, 2004b). This is especially important when ethnic majorities face 
relative decline due to immigration or other sources of differential ethnic population growth.  
Majority ethnicity remains a vital force within modern nation-states and much of the 
‘nationalism’ we see is in fact the political expression of majority ethnicity, albeit of a less 
exclusivist and dominant variety than that observed in postcolonial states such as Malaysia, 
Sri Lanka or Assam in India (Horowitz 1985: 196-202). In Britain, a survey I conducted in 
late 2017 showed that when a group of British respondents were given a choice between a 
high volume of high-skilled immigrants, maintaining current immigration levels, and a lower 
volume of lower-skilled immigrants, involving reduced immigration, opinion divided roughly 
evenly between the two options. When it was mentioned to a separate group that the high 
immigration option would produce an 8-point greater decline in White British share by 2060, 
support for current immigration levels dropped 30 points, with over 80 percent favouring the 
low immigration/low skill option (Kaufmann 2018). In short, the demographic decline of the 




Indeed, the American National Election Study (ANES) 2016 Pilot Survey data 
presented in figure 1 shows that after opposition to immigration and political correctness, the 
extent to which a white American feels their white identity is important to them is the most 
important predictor of whether they supported Donald Trump in the presidential primaries. 
Majority ethnic identity is also becoming more salient as the share of non-Hispanic whites 
declines in America. During Trump’s 2015-16 primary campaign, Linda Tropp and Eric 
Knowles (2018) find that whites’ propensity to support him rose from 20 percent in a 
neighbourhood without Hispanics to 35 percent in a half-Hispanic neighbourhood (Tropp and 
Knowles 2016). Jardina (2014: 50-53, 70, 82) shows, across a range of surveys, that the share 
of whites who say white identity is ‘very’ or ‘moderately’ important to them almost doubled 
between the 1990s and 2010s - to the point that 45-65 percent now say it matters. As ethnic 
majorities demographically decline in the West, these identities are likely to become more 
salient. Meanwhile, the forces which bolstered the statist elements of nationalism – interstate 
war, ideological conflict – are much less important than in the past (Pinker 2011). War and 
Great Power competition helped integrate France’s new immigrants in the early twentieth 






Source: ANES 2016 pilot survey. N=874; R2=.419. Controls for party identity, with state 
fixed effects and design weights. 
 
Ethnic Nationalism 
 Meinecke (1908), Kohn (1944), and later Smith (1991), developed the ethnic-civic 
typology of nationalism. The theory essentially argues that the circumstances of a nation’s 
birth mark it for life. That is, nations that seceded from states, such as Estonia, or unified 
smaller units into a larger state, like Germany, had to define themselves in ethnic rather than 
institutional terms. They were also more influenced by nineteenth century counter-
Enlightenment than eighteenth century Enlightenment ideas. 
Ethnic nationalism defines national membership in ethnic terms while civic 
nationalism defines it in terms of territory and the rights and duties of citizenship. Rogers 
Brubaker applied this framework to the question of immigrant inclusion in his Citizenship 
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from the circumstances of these nations’ birth meant French citizenship was more open than 
Germany’s to immigrants. The implication here is that national membership in Germany is 
ethnically exclusive whereas in France it is inclusive because it is defined on the basis of 
territory and republican principles. Even if we set aside the problem of German reforms to 
citizenship laws which facilitated the naturalisation of immigrants in the 1990s, the question 
remains whether the typical French voter truly conceives of her nation in the civic terms set 
out in French law. Here it is noteworthy that in the 2005-7 World Values Survey (WVS), 
more respondents from the ‘civic’ United States or Canada said having ancestors born in the 
country was an important criteria for citizenship than did those in ‘ethnic’ Norway. Indeed, 
the data in figure 2 shows that social liberalism counts for far more than the circumstances of 
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Source: World Values Survey 2005-2007. 
 
 Many have gone on to apply the term ethnic nationalism to the politics of immigration 
restriction and the far right. Yet immigrants comprised no more than 1-2 percent of most 
European nations’ population in 1900 (Baycroft and Hewtson 2006: 328). Most ethnic 
minorities were either regional groups like the Bretons or native minorities such as Jews or 
Roma. In short, the problems that would later emerge played little part in the definition of 
ethnic and civic nationhood. Another blind spot concerns ethnic majorities. This omission 
shaped international norms as they emerged between 1918 and 1945. As Liav Orgad points 
out, ethnic majorities have no standing in international law, which only refers to nation-states 
or ethnic minorities. As a result, nations rely on ostensibly ‘colour-blind’ statist rationales to 
protect their ethnic majorities (Orgad 2015, ch. 5). For instance, the Danish immigration law 
which limits citizenship to spouses over age 24 results in reduced Muslim marriage 
migration, thereby protecting the Danish ethnic majority from ethnic change. Given the 
limited effectiveness of measures such as language and history tests, or statements of national 





 The demographically stable world which incubated nationalism theory offers a limited 
vocabulary for describing the outlook of the bulk of populist right voters or even the majority 
of western publics. Even taking on board critiques of the ethnic-civic dichotomy - which 
decompose it into an interplay between ideologies of inclusion/exclusion and discrete 
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symbols, or allows for contestation and change - is insufficient for understanding the ‘new 
nationalism’ in the West today (ie Zimmer 2003; Hutchinson 2005; Kaufmann 2008). This is 
because we must distinguish between ethnic traditions and ethnic exclusion within 
nationalism.  
Perhaps it is easier to begin with smaller units. For instance, someone living in 
Harlem in New York may view the area as having an African-American ethnic tradition even 
as they accept that you don’t have to be black to be a Harlemite. The same might hold in 
Acadiana (‘Cajun country’) in Louisiana: it has a French-Acadian ethnic tradition, but one 
can be non-French and still be treated as a fully equal member of the regional territorial 
community of Acadiana. So too at national level: Sweden may have a White Swedish ethnic 
tradition, while at the same time people might accept that members of the Swedish nation can 
come in any colour or creed and all are fully equal. The same even holds within ethnic 
groups. A Cajun with a ‘typical’ Acadian-French surname like Leger is not considered more 
of a Cajun than, for instance, Steve Riley, who fronts a popular Cajun band, since the Cajuns 
have absorbed people from other European backgrounds over time through intermarriage. So 
too a Gaelic speaker is not perceived as more Irish than an English-speaker of Irish descent. 
Archetypes and traditions do not define membership but they do delineate what I term an 
ethno-traditional form of national identity. Critically, both minorities and majorities may be 
attached to ethno-traditions of nationhood and seek to defend them. 
 
Ethno-Traditionalism in Public Opinion 
 
 It could be argued that those who say it’s important to have British ancestry to be 
‘truly British’ are ethnic nationalists. Indeed, 60.4 percent of White British respondents on 
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the 2013 British Social Attitudes Survey said having British ancestry was ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ 
important for being ‘truly British,’ with a broadly even 30-30 split between these two 
response categories. Yet 86 percent of Britons in 2004 also say you don’t have to be white to 
be British (Phillips 2004). Likewise, in the US, Americans of all races rate blacks and whites 
as more American (on a 7-point scale) than Asians (Devos and Banaji 2005: 447). Yet a 
question asking about whether certain aspects ‘should be important …in making someone a 
true American,’ found that only 17 percent agreed that ‘having European ancestors’ (10 
percent for ‘being white’) was very or fairly important for being a ‘true American’ 
(Schildkraut 2007: 602). Hispanics were actually more likely than whites to endorse these 
sentiments. Unfortunately no question was asked about African-Americans. 
A somewhat more contentious way of getting at the question of ethno-traditions is the 
following, asked of 715 Americans on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) in September 
2017: ‘America includes everyone, but the three most authentically American groups are 
American Indians, White Anglo-Saxon Protestants and African-Americans because they 
shaped America from the start.’ 45 percent of blacks and Native Americans, 40 percent of 
whites and 25 percent of Hispanics and Asians agreed. I also asked a separate sample of 467 
Americans on MTurk in 2017, ‘All surnames are equally American, but if someone from 
another country asked you what a characteristic American surname was, which of the 
following would you choose?’ Options were (rotated): Browning, Graziano, Hernandez, 
Schultz and Wong. 81 percent of those who responded chose Browning, the Anglo surname, 
including 85 percent of Hispanics. In addition, 72 percent of 525 respondents – including 70 
percent of Catholics - selected Protestant as opposed to Catholic or Jewish as the typical 
American religion. Of course this could be because Anglo surnames and the Protestant 
religion are statistically overrepresented, but I would interpret these results as also 
recognising what Schrag (1973) termed the American ‘imago’, or majority ethnic ‘American’ 
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archetype. Does this make these respondents ethnic nationalists? I aver that most Americans 
are not ethnic nationalist but many are ethno-traditional. That is, few would restrict national 
membership to those from the dominant ethnic group, but many recognise that the majority 
ethno-tradition forms part of the myth-symbol complex of the nation. 
Consider the following question, asked of 67 British Sikhs: ‘A travel magazine 
published a list of things that tourists from India found distinctive about Britain. On a scale of 
0 to 100, how British do you feel when you think of each of the following (0 = not at all 
British, 100 = very British).’ Two questions included ‘The mix of different people living in 
Britain’ and ‘The appearance of many British people: pale skin, blue eyes and red or light 
hair.’ The former elicited a 65/100 but the latter still ranked a 50/100, the same as the Royal 
Family and above South Asian British reference points such as Chicken Tikka Masala, the 
television series Goodness Gracious Me or Sikh British broadcast personality Hardeep Kohli. 
What is especially interesting is the relationship between the two measures, which is not 
statistically significant. As the top right quadrant of figure 3 shows, many British Sikhs 







Source: Gorby Jandu, survey of British Sikhs, Nov. 2017- Feb. 2018. N=67. 
 
 Or consider the way Rachid Kaci, a French conservative politician of Algerian 
descent identifies with the ethno-traditions of France: ‘The Gauls… are our collective 
ancestors, since they inaugurated… [French] history down to our days, via Clovis, Charles 
Martel…’ (Lav 2017). Likewise, consider the roughly 30 percent of Latinos and Asians who 
voted for Donald Trump in 2016. In the aftermath of the Charlottesville riots in August 2017, 
53 percent of nearly 300 Latino and Asian Trump voters agreed that America should ‘protect 
and preserve its white European heritage’ - similar to White Trump voters.1 Moreover, in my 
survey experiment examining skills versus numerical preferences (Kaufmann 2018), I found 
that when I flagged to non-White British respondents that immigration would bring a decline 
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increase their support for reducing immigration from 50 to 63 percent. The shift induced 
among conservative minority voters was not as large as among White Britons, but reveals an 
important strain of ethno-traditional nationalism that chimes with evidence from other small-
scale data presented earlier showing minority conservatives to be more restrictionist than 
white liberals. 
These conservative responses are consistent with the position that an archetypal 
Briton has British ancestry (or that a typical American is white, American Indian or black, 
has an Anglo surname and is Protestant). Yet someone without these traits is an equal 
member of the nation. The ethnic majority (or established groups) is part of what makes the 
nation distinct, but is not a sine qua non of membership. Having said this, it should be noted 
that minorities tend to be less attached to ethno-traditions than members of ethnic majorities. 
For example, only 18 percent of non-white Britons replied that having British ancestry was 
very or fairly important for being ‘truly British’ compared to 60 percent of White Britons. In 
MTurk and Prolific Academic surveys I conducted in January 2017, I find that minority 
Trump voters express less sadness (32-48/100) at the impending minority status of white 
Americans than white Trump voters (54-66/100), but considerably more than white Clinton 
voters (20/100).2 In other words, minorities can be ethno-traditional nationalists, but ethnic 
majorities are more likely to be. Ideology seems to matter more than ethnicity in the US than 
Britain.  
An ethno-tradition of nationhood consists of the existence of a particular 
configuration of ethnic groups, often including an ethnic majority - because 80 percent of the 
world’s states have one (Vanhanen 1999). The majority is an especially central component of 
ethno-traditional nationalism in the most homogeneous world regions: East Asia, western 
Europe and North Africa. The ethnic majority in turn orients toward ‘traditional’ symbolic 
elements such as physical appearance, religion, language and surname. These may define 
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group boundaries but not always: in other cases they merely define an archetype, leaving 
group boundaries hazy, as in the Turkish-Kurdish case.  
 
Public Opinion on Immigration and National Identity 
 
Many populist right voters do not believe one must be a member of the ethnic majority to be 
a citizen. Yet they consider the majority ethnie to be an important aspect of the national 
tradition and seek to limit immigration to protect it. Such voters, I would argue, tend to 
favour immigrant assimilation, not expulsion. There is thus an important distinction to be 
drawn between a closed ethnic nationalism on the one hand, which seeks to halt or reverse 
migration; and ethno-traditional nationalism on the other, which is about slowing the pace of 
change. 
 This is not to say ethnic nationalism doesn’t exist in the West. Radicals insist on 
repatriating immigrants, which in Britain was a mantra not only of the far right National 
Front (NF) and British National Party (BNP), but also for the right-wing of the Conservative 
Party. Until the late 1980s, the Conservative right’s Immigration and Repatriation Policy 
Committee seriously explored the idea of encouraging hundreds of thousands of non-white 
British residents to go ‘home.’ Today, the BNP advocates ‘generous grants to those of foreign 
descent who are resident here and who wish to leave permanently.’3 For Greg Johnson, an 
American Alt-Right figurehead: ‘If it was not too much trouble for all these people to come 
here…it will not be too much trouble for them to go back.’ This view contrasts with those on 
the ‘left’ of the Alt-Right who merely wish to stop immigration (Hawley 2017: 16). However, 
in both cases, there is a view that those outside the dominant ethnie cannot be members of the 
nation even if they are permitted to reside in the country. In addition, these movements 
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oppose inter-racial marriage and assimilation. These far right actors nicely fit Kohn’s, and 
later Brubaker’s, definition of ethnic nationalism.  
The populist right – at least in terms of its rhetoric and mass support - cannot be 
viewed the same way. It may be that populist right leaders and cadres entertain ethnic 
nationalist views - though many have minority candidates which problematises this. 
Regardless, their messaging, and their voters, do not readily slot into the ethnic/civic 
approach. Let’s begin with anti-immigration survey respondents rather than populist right 
supporters, as this is the pool from which populist right voters tend to be drawn. In the 1991-
2008 WVS across western Europe, North America and Australia (‘the West’), there is an 
even split between those who advocate ‘strict limits’ on immigration and those who say 
immigration should be permitted ‘where jobs [are] available.’ These two intermediate 
categories on a 4-category question account for over 80 percent of responses. Only 4 percent 
favour a closed door and 8 percent open borders.  
In the 2005-7 wave of the WVS in the West, only a third of the 4 percent who said 
immigrants should be prohibited from coming said ancestry was ‘very’ important as a criteria 
for citizenship, a further third said it was ‘rather’ important and a final third gave the pure 
‘civic’ response that it was ‘not’ important. The two-thirds share for strong or moderate 
ethnic nationalism (ancestry ‘very’/’rather’ important) compares with a little under half 
ethnic nationalist among those favouring ‘strict limits’ and about 30 percent ethnic nationalist 
for pro-immigration respondents (i.e. those saying ‘if jobs available’ or ‘anyone can come’). 
Meanwhile, opposition to interracial marriage is low: among Britons born after 1980, it 
stands at just 14 percent, rising to 25 percent across all age groups. Among white Americans, 
only 16 percent oppose black-white intermarriage (Ford 2014; Newport 2013).  
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So those who call for a halt to immigration, take an ethnic view of national 
membership and oppose inter-racial marriage comprise no more than 2-3 percent of the 
population. With a looser definition, involving some support for ethnic criteria of 
membership, opposition to intermarriage and limited immigration, the figure may approach 
25 percent. However, this wider penumbra of voters does not meet the strict definition of 
ethnic nationalism, which would entail exclusion or deportation of immigrants and a high 
priority on ethnicity as a precondition of national membership. After all, immigrants or 
minorities already account for 10-30 percent of the population of many western nations, so 
ethnic nationalists would be expected to favour a complete freeze on immigration, especially 
if of a different race or religion from the majority. 
Populist right voters’ continued support for at least some immigration makes it 
problematic to view them as ethno-nationalist. For instance, a 2017 survey of 3600 Britons I 
undertook with Simon Hix and Thomas Leeper of the London School of Economics shows 
that the typical White British UKIP voter prefers an annual immigrant inflow of 67,000 while 
the average White British Leave voter wants 81,000. This is considerably less than the 
300,000 inflow which obtained at the time or the 193,000 sought by Remain voters, but is far 
from zero (Hix et. al. 2017). Meanwhile, just 8 percent of Leavers and 11 percent of BNP or 
UKIP voters call for a halt to immigration. Among populist right voters across a wider range 
of West European countries in the 2016 European Social Survey (ESS), only 19 percent said 
no immigrants of a different race and religion from the majority should be admitted. The 
modal response on a 4-category measure, at 46 percent, was to allow ‘a few’ while a further 
30 percent favoured ‘some’ and 4.5 percent ‘many.’ Here again, populist right voters tend to 
be anti-immigration but most don’t favour a halt to immigration, much less repatriation. Ergo, 
ethnic nationalism does not capture the sentiment of the bulk of populist right and anti-





 A better way of thinking about many populist right voters is as ethno-traditional 
nationalists who seek a slower rate of ethnic change. That is, they wish to protect 
communities which serve as symbols of nationhood. Moreover, an important group of these 
supporters can be assuaged by the belief that immigrants and their descendants are becoming 
part of the majority ‘us’ through intermarriage and assimilation. To illustrate: in the Yougov 
survey I conducted in August 2016, I asked British respondents about their views on 
immigration and how much they would be willing to pay to reduce immigration from the 
European Union (Kaufmann 2017). Those who favoured a ‘hard Brexit’ position of zero EU 
immigrants had to pay 5 percent of their income, with smaller increments for lesser 
reductions.  
I divided respondents into three random categories to conduct what is known as a 
survey experiment. Group A read nothing before answering the questions on immigration. 
The second Group read a ‘civic nationalist’ passage emphasising rising diversity within a 
secure political nationhood: 
 
'Britain is changing, becoming increasingly diverse. The 2011 census shows that White 
British people are already a minority in four British cities, including London. Over a quarter 
of births in England and Wales are to foreign-born mothers. Young Britons are also much 
more diverse than older Britons. Just 4.5% of those older than 65 are nonwhite but more than 
20% of those under 25 are. Minorities' younger average age, higher birth rate and continued 
immigration mean that late this century, according to Professor David Coleman of Oxford 
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University, White British people will be in the minority. We should embrace our diversity, 
which gives Britain an advantage in the global economy.’ 
 
The third group read a passage based on the observation that the ethnic majority absorbs 
immigrants and thus is continuing Britain’s ethnic traditions: 
 
‘Immigration has risen and fallen over time, but, like the English language, Britain's culture is 
only superficially affected by foreign influence. According to Professor Eric Kaufmann of the 
University of London, a large share of the children of European immigrants have become 
White British. Historians tell us that French, Irish, Jews and pre-war black immigrants largely 
melted into the white majority. Those of mixed race, who share common ancestors with 
White British people, are growing faster than all minority groups and 8 in 10 of them marry 
whites. In the long run, today's minorities will be absorbed into the majority and foreign 
identities will fade, as they have for public figures with immigrant ancestors like Boris 
Johnson or Peter Mandelson. Britain shapes its migrants, migration doesn't shape Britain.' 
 
There was little difference between those who read nothing and those who read the first 
passage. I believe this owes much to the fact that current narratives approximate the 
diversity-in-civic nation account. However, among those reading the assimilationist passage, 
opinion on immigration shifted in a liberal direction - the first example of a liberalising 
manipulation in the survey experiment literature (Hopkins 2016). The effects were especially 
marked on the question of EU immigration, notably among UKIP, Leave and white working-
class respondents. Thus the proportion of UKIP voters willing to pay 5 percent of their 
income to reduce EU immigration to zero fell from 45 percent among those reading the first 
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or no passage to 15 percent for those who saw the second, assimilationist, vignette 
(Kaufmann 2017). This effect is caused by exposure to a mere paragraph. A sustained effort 
to highlight ethnic assimilation and majority ethnic continuity could arguably convince a 
wider array of populist right voters. This exercise suggests that many have a more flexible 
definition of ethnicity and national identity than the ethnic nationalism category allows. An 
explanation based on the desire to protect majority ethnic preponderance or to safeguard 
national ethno-traditions – through both slower immigration and assimilation - fits the 
evidence better than an account based on Kohn-style ethnic exclusivity. 
  
Conclusion 
Concepts derived from periods when immigration was minimal, and when political rather 
than cultural questions dominated nationalism theory, are not well-suited to capturing the 
‘new nationalism’ we see in the West today. In this paper, I make the case for a new term, 
ethno-traditional nationalism, which, alongside majority ethnicity, more accurately accounts 
for the platforms, conceptions of national membership and policy preferences of the populist 
right. While majority ethnicity is growing in importance and is a major factor behind populist 
right voting in the West, conservative-minded ethnic minorities may also be attached to the 
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